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L2This paper evaluates the effects of capital controls onfirm-level stock returns and real investment using data from
Brazil. On average, there is a statistically significant drop in cumulative abnormal returns consistent with an
increase in the cost of capital for Brazilian firms following capital control announcements. Large firms and the
largest exporting firms appear less negatively affected compared to external-finance-dependent firms, and
capital controls on equity inflows have a more negative announcement effect on equity returns than those on
debt inflows. Overall, the findings have implications for macro-finance models that abstract from heterogeneity






The massive surge of foreign capital to emerging markets in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 has led to a
renewed debate about the merits of the free flow of international
capital. Given the very low interest rates in developed economies,
investors were attracted to the higher rates in Brazil, Chile, Taiwan,
Thailand, South Korea, and many other emerging markets (Fratzscher,
2012). To stem the flow of capital and manage the attendant risks
several emerging markets imposed taxes or controls to curb inflows ofli, Robin Greenwood, Sebnem
s Kalori, Seppo Pynnonen, Adi
e and conference on Monetary
er Forum-International Capital
justment Conference in Zurich,
onference, AEA Meetings-San
el Hill, University of Sao Paulo-
estions. We also thank Hayley
esearch assistance and HBS for
nc.edu (A. Chari),foreign capital.1 Further, in December of 2012, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) released an official statement endorsing a limited
use of capital controls (IMF, 2012).
The case for capital controls primarily rests on macro-prudential
measures designed to mitigate systemic risk as well as the volatility of
foreign capital inflows. However, controls can also have an implicitly
protectionist or mercantilist motive to maintain persistent currency
undervaluation (Pasricha, 2017; Jeanne et al., 2012; Magud et al.,
2011; Magud and Reinhart, 2007). Policy makers from emerging Asia
and Latin America expressed concerns that massive foreign capital
inflows can lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate and loss of
competitiveness, with potentially lasting effects on the export sector.
Our paper is thefirst to provide direct empirical evidence of the costs
of controls on foreign capital inflows using firm-level data from Brazil
seen as a poster child for the recent policy changes. Previous research1 According to the governor of Taiwan's central bank, Perng Fai-Nan “The US printed a
lot of money, so there's a lot of hot money flowing around. We see hot money in Taiwan
and elsewhere in Asia…. These short-term capital flows are disturbing emerging econo-
mies.” Similarly, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan warned of the risk
of a global market “crash” should foreign investors start bailing out of their risky asset po-
sitions in emerging markets generated by the loose monetary policies of developed
economies.
2 The International Institute of Finance estimated that foreign capital inflows increased
from US$11.2bn in 2006 to US$79.5bn in the following year. Brazil emerged as the biggest
recipient of foreign capital in Latin America and the second highest among emergingmar-
kets after China.
3 Banco Central Do Brasil accessed November 29, 2012.shows that a variety of barriers can segment international capital
markets (Stulz, 2005; Henry, 2007). Legal constraints, institutional
quality, foreign ownership restrictions, discriminatory taxes, and
transaction costs such as information asymmetries affect international
portfolio choice. The type of international investment barrier we study
in this paper is the effect of discriminatory taxation of foreign investors.
The Brazilian Imposto Sobre Operações Financeiras (IOF) constitutes such
a discriminatory tax as it contributes explicitly to the direct costs of
foreigners investing in Brazilian financial markets.
Focusing on Brazil has several advantages. First, Brazil applied a
series of capital controls measures that ranged across debt, equity and
derivative instruments between 2008 and 2013. We have detailed
information about the policy changes as they relate to specific instru-
ments andmagnitudes. Second, we have a precise set of announcement
dates that facilitate a clean identification strategy to quantify the
market's reaction to the capital control announcements. Third, stock
market data and comprehensive firm-level financial statement data
provide us with a rich and unique setting to examine the impact of
these policy changes on Brazilian firms.
The data offer valuable cross-sectional variation to test for (a) cost of
capital and exchange rate effects, and (b) the impact of external finance
dependence and credit constraints in the aftermath of the controls.
Importantly, firm-level data have the advantage that they can shed
light on the channels through which capital controls affect Brazilian
firms. Fourth, we have access to proprietary export data from the
Brazilian export authority (Secex) for the listed Brazilian firms. The
firm-level export data allow us to examine both the firm-level response
to capital flows as well as the impact of capital controls on the compet-
itiveness of exporting firms.
Theoretically, when a country imposes capital controls taxes,
expected returns on the risky assets subject to the tax would increase.
Capital controls impose investment barriers that segment international
capital markets, creating a price wedge that drives up the expected
return relative to the benchmark return under full integration (Stulz,
1981). Further, capital controls can affect the cost of external finance
and therefore firms that rely on external finance to fund their invest-
ment opportunities (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Using firm-level data,
we also test whether external finance dependent firms (or industries)
in Brazil are more adversely affected by capital controls. In particular,
we conduct an event-study analysis using capital control announce-
ment dates together with stock prices and firm-level data from
Datastream, Worldscope, and Secex.
The key results are as follows. First, consistent with an increase in
expected returns or the cost of capital, on average, there is a significant
decline in cumulative abnormal returns for Brazilian firms following the
imposition of capital controls on foreign portfolio inflows in 2008–2009.
Evidence about the mechanism by which the cost of capital rises
suggests that on average market interest rates increase significantly in
the aftermath of the controls. It is worth noting that these interest
rates increase against the backdrop of quantitative easing in the US
and other developed countries that put downward pressure on the
world interest rate.We also use imputed cost of capitalmeasures to pro-
vide corroborating evidence that the cost of capital goes up significantly
following capital control announcements.
Second, the data suggest that large firms are less affected by the
controls, perhaps consistent with large-firm access to internal capital
markets or alternative sources of finance. Third, we find that exporting
firms are less adversely affected by controls. The coefficient estimates
suggest that the larger exporting firms, in particular, are somewhat
shielded. Fourth, we find that external-finance dependent firms that
aremore dependent aremore adversely affected by the capital controls.
Fifth, controls on debt flows are associated with less negative
returns, suggesting that the market views equity and debt flows as dif-
ferent. Historically, Brazil experimented with the IOF tax exclusively on
debt flows, extending the purview to include equity instruments was
done for the very first time in October 2009 (see Goldfajn and Minella,2007). The market's reaction may, therefore, be capturing the element
of surprise or unexpected nature of the policy change to include equity
flows.
Earlier studies primarily focused on foreign ownership restrictions
where either a subset of domestic assets or certain share classes are
made available to foreign investors (Chari and Henry, 2004, 2008;
Henry, 2007). In contrast, our paper provides systematic evidence on
the impact of discriminatory taxation of foreign investors via the IOF
on the stock market valuation of Brazilian firms. A related paper,
Forbes et al. (forthcoming), shows that an increase in Brazil's tax on
foreign investment in bonds causes investors to significantly decrease
their portfolio allocations to Brazil in both bonds and equities. Investors
simultaneously decrease allocations to countries viewed as more likely
to use capital controls. Similarly, Forbes (2007a) studies the impact of
Chilean Encaje experiment with unremunerated reserve requirements
in the 1990s on the financial constraints that small, traded firms face
(see also Forbes, 2007b).
More generally, a growing theoretical macro literature posits the
benefits of capital controls albeit focusing exclusively on debt rather
than equity to motivate the model frameworks (Bianchi and Mendoza,
2013; Farhi and Werning, forthcoming; Korinek, 2010). On the empiri-
cal front, Klein (2012) casts doubts about assumptions behind recent
calls for a greater use of episodic controls on capital inflows and finds,
with a few exceptions, there is little evidence of the efficacy of capital
controls.
Similarly, contrary to prescriptions put forth in the recent theoretical
macro literature, Fernández et al. (2013) do not find evidence of capital
controls implemented as macro-prudential tools in the period 2005–
2011. In a related paper, Glick et al. (2006) find that countries with
liberalized capital accounts experience a lower likelihood of currency
crises. Obstfeld et al. (2005) find that historical data bear out the
constraints implied by the trilemma between exchange rate stability,
monetary policy autonomy and capital mobility.
Thepaper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews themacroeconomic
conditions in Brazil in the 2000s and provides information about the
recent use of capital controls measures. Section 3 provides a brief
theoretical motivation and details about the event study methodology.
Section 4 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 5 presents
the results and additional tests to ensure the robustness of our findings.
Section 6 concludes.2. Background: Brazil in the 2000s and the recent use of capital
control taxes
Except for a brief recession during the last two-quarters of 2008,
caused by the global financial crisis, the Brazilian economy expanded
throughout the 2000s due to a commodity exports and consumer
boom. The impact of the financial crisis was short lived, and Brazil's
economy swiftly returned to growth by the second quarter of 2009.
The commodity boom, paired with increased inflows of foreign capital,
placed upward pressure on the Brazilian currency, the Real.2 In 2008,
the Real appreciated by 50% to 1.6 R$/US$ from a low of 3.1 R$/US$ in
2004.3
In an attempt to prevent an excessive inflow of foreign capital,
stabilize the exchange rate, and reduce the upward trend in inflation,
Brazil's government adopted a system of capital controls on inflows
from abroad. In March 2008, the government established the Imposto
Sobre Operações Financeiras (IOF), a financial transaction tax of
1.5% placed on incoming foreign fixed-income investments effectively
immediately, as ameans of quelling theflowof capital into the economy.
Note that the IOF is a tax that can be levied on a range of financial
operations including foreign credit, foreign exchange, securities, and
so on. Also, it is a tax over which the executive branch has very broad
powers regarding triggering events and applicable rates.4 Under the
Brazilian Constitution, the National Congress by law has to approve
most tax increases and changes usually take effect after ninety days.
However, the IOF is an exception—a “policy decree” can modify the
tax that ranks below a law and does not require Congressional ratifica-
tion. On a discretionary basis, the Finance Ministry can overnight
change the IOF tax that becomes effective immediately from its
enactment date. Using data from investor interviews, Forbes et al.
(forthcoming) document that investors did not anticipate the controls.
Appendix A provides specific details about the IOF tax legislation.
By October of 2008, the wide-reaching effects of the international
financial crisiswere becoming clear. Net foreign capital inflows dropped
from US$88.3 billion in 2007 to US$28.3 billion in 2008. In particular,
net foreign portfolio investments of debt and equity fell from
US$48.1 billion in 2007 to −US$0.77 billion in 2008. To stem the
outflow of investment the government eliminated the IOF.
However, Brazil recovered quickly from the economic downturn,
and during the first nine months of 2009, approximately US$20 billion
of primarily US-led foreign investments entered the Brazilian equities
market.5 With the resumption of massive capital inflows, capital
controls were imposed again as early as February of 2009. On October
20, 2009, Brazilian authorities expanded the IOF tax to a 2% rate on
fixed income, in addition to portfolio and equity investments. The IOF
did not apply to inflows of direct investment.
Since its re-introduction in October of 2009, the IOF tax was
repeatedly raised and expanded to include other forms of investments
by the Brazilian government to control the influx of foreign capital
(see Table 1 for a detailed list). By late 2010, the Real continued to
appreciate, emerging as one of the strongest performing currencies in
the world. On October 5, 2010, the IOF on fixed-income instruments
was raised to 4%; less than two weeks later the tax was raised to 6%.
In early 2011, the exchange rate remained at R$1.6 against the U.S.
dollar, and the blame for Brazil's currency appreciation was targeted
on incoming foreign capital originating in developed markets with US
flows accounting for the largest fraction of these flows. The government
decided to raise the IOF to 6% on foreign loanswith aminimummaturity
of up to 360 days inMarch 2011. By early April, the IOFwas extended to
loans with a maturity of up to two years. The increase in tax rate repre-
sented a shift away from a dependency on high interest rates to combat
the growing levels of inflation in Brazil. In an attempt to depreciate the
value of the Real, the Central Bank also aggressively cut its overnight
rate (Selic). Over a ten-month period, the Selic rate was cut eight
consecutive times, from 12.5% in late August 2011 to 8% in July 2012.6
In early December 2011, however, the 2% IOF tax on equities was
removed. In the first week of June 2013, Brazil removed the tax on
foreign investments in local debt and the 1% tax charged currency
derivatives.7,8 On July 1st, the government further eliminated reserve
requirements on short dollar positions held by local banks.9
Details about the implementation procedure for the IOF tax
(Appendix A) suggest that the capital controls announcements4 See www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/aliquotas/impcresegcamb.htm.
5 “Brazil Increases Tax on Foreign Exchange Transactions Related to Foreign Invest-
ments in the Financial and Capital Markets,” Memorandum, Simpson Thatcher & Bartlet
LLP, October 22, 2009.
6 Chamon and Garcia (2016) show that the while controls were effective in partially
segmenting the Brazilian financial market from the international markets, they do not





on-bets-against-the-dollar.html.surprised most market participants. A candidate explanation for the
element of surprise is also that the set of instruments thatwere included
under the umbrella of capital controls was extended to equity and other
instruments previously not been subject to them. Previous experiments
were restricted to debt instruments. Now the purview was broadened
to include equity, ADRs, derivative contracts and other instruments.
Moreover, the rates were changed in an ad hoc fashion. It is possible
that after the first controls had been announced in March 2008, the
market might have anticipated that the economy was in a new capital
controls regime. However, these controls were quickly removed
in light of the Lehman collapse and the global financial crisis.10
Subsequently the controls were reintroduced in October 2009 and
implemented with a widening reach in the two and a half years that
followed.
It is nevertheless important to acknowledge that any policy change
that results in winners and losers would be subject to media attention
as various constituents in a democracy express their views about an
impending change or trend in policy direction. If capital controls were
expected to drive up the cost of capital, external finance dependent
firms and smaller firms would stand to lose and be opposed to the
controls. Similarly, if there was an unprecedented move to implement
controls on equity flows, firms listed on the stock market or stock
exchange executives may voice their opposition to the controls. For
example, the decision to place capital controls on incoming foreign
investments was not unanimously supported. Edemir Pinto, chief
executive of the Brazilian Stock Exchange, called on the government
to remove some of the existing capital controls because the IOF was
damaging the stock market. Over half of the capital raised by Brazilian
companies from IPOs originated from foreign investors, and Pinto
claimed the tax on financial transactions was choking foreign inflows
of capital.11
On the other hand, as a result of themassive capital inflows the con-
stituent firmsmost likely to be hurt by a Real appreciation are exporters
whose competitiveness would be adversely affected in world markets.
Exporting firms would, therefore, stand to gain if the implementation
of capital controls led to a reversal of the Real appreciation. Also note
that the IOF tax rate is zero on foreign exchange transactions related
to the inflow of revenue derived from the export of goods and services
and outflow of funds derived from the import of goods. To assess
whether different constituents expressed opinions in the media, we
undertook a detailed survey of Brazilian newspapers, business journals,
and other press sources. Appendix B presents a sample of these articles.
Please note that most of these articles are in Portuguese.
The next section briefly discusses the theoretical underpinnings and
the empirical methodology.3. Theoretical underpinnings and the event study methodology
In addition to offering domestic investors an expanded opportunity
set for portfolio diversification purposes, international investment
entails two unique dimensions that are not particularly relevant in the
context of purely domestic investments namely exchange rate risk
and the problem of market segmentation. With respect to market
segmentation, international asset pricing models incorporate capital
flow restrictions (for instance, Black, 1974; Stulz, 1981; Lessard, 1983)
and analyze the pricing effects of investment barriers.10 OnOctober 22nd 2008, the IOF taxwas removed but this coincides with amassive de-
cline in the US stock market in the midst of the global financial crisis—the S&P 500 index
fell by 6.1% and the Dow Jones Industrial Average recorded a loss of 514 points, or 5.7%.
Given that we do not want this date to confound the results, we exclude this event date
from our estimations. Note that the results remain robust to the inclusion of this event
(not reported but available upon request).
11 Robert Cookson and Joe Leahy, “Call to ease Brazil's capital controls” Financial Times,
October 25, 2011.
12 For more details, see MacKinlay (1997).
Table 1
Capital Controls in Brazil: 2008–2013.
Source: Brazilian Legislation and Brittany A. Baumann and Kevin P. Gallagher, “Navigating Capital Flows in Brazil and Chile,” Initiative for Policy DialogueWorking Paper Series, Columbia
University, June 2012. Note: IOF (Imposto Sobre Operações Financeiras) is a tax placed on financial transactions. On October 22nd 2008, the IOF tax was removed (debt event). As this event
coincideswith the decline in theUS stockmarket in themidst of the global financial crisis, we exclude this potentially confounding event date from our estimations. Results remain robust














3-12-2008 0.17% Tightening IOF tax = 1.5% on fixed income investments made by non-residents 1 0 3-17-2008 6391
10-19-2009 −2.88% Tightening IOF tax = 2% introduced on equities and fixed income securities 1 1 10-20-2009 6983
11-18-2009 −0.28% Tightening Tax = 1.5% on American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) converted into local stocks 0 1 11-19-2009 7011
10-4-2010 1.28% Tightening IOF tax = 4% on fixed income bonds and derivatives; 2% for equities 1 0 10-5-2010 7323
10-18-2010 −2.61% Tightening IOF tax = 6% on fixed income bonds and derivatives; 2% for equities 1 0 10-19-2010 7330
12-30-2010 0.00% Tightening IOF tax = 2% on American Depositary Receipts, converted into local stocks 0 1 12-31-2010 7412
3-28-2011 0.34% Tightening IOF tax = 6% on overseas loans and bonds with maturities up to 1 year 1 0 3-29-2011 7456
4-6-2011 0.20% Tightening IOF tax to overseas bonds with maturities up to 2 years 1 0 4-7-2001 7457
7-26-2011 −1.77% Tightening Tax of 1% on foreign exchange derivatives; legislation allow tax to be increased up to 25% 0 1 7-27-2011 7536
12-1-2011 −0.44% Easing IOF tax = 0% on variable income instrum. traded on the exchange and certain debentures 0 1 12-2-2011 7632
2-29-2012 1.52% Tightening IOF tax to cover overseas loans and bonds with maturities up to 3 years 1 0 3-1-2012 7683
3-9-2012 −0.48% Tightening IOF tax to cover overseas loans and bonds with maturities up to 5 years 1 0 3-12-2012 7698
5-21-2012 −2.74% Easing IOF tax = 1.5% for individual borrowers (from 2.5%) 1 0 5-22-2012 7726
6-13-2012 −0.54% Easing IOF tax to overseas loans and bonds with maturities up to 2 years 1 0 6-14-2012 7751
12-4-2012 0.20% Easing IOF tax to overseas loans and bonds with maturities up to 1 year 1 0 12-5-2012 7853
12-23-2013 −1.46% Easing IOF tax = 0% on American Depositary Receipts, converted into local stocks 0 1 12-24-2013 8165Barriers to international investment may take many forms such as
exchange and capital controls by governments,which restrict the access
of foreigners to the local capital markets, reduce their freedom to
repatriate capital and dividends, and limit the fraction of a local firm's
equity that foreigners may own (Chari and Henry, 2004). Foreign
investors may face a lack of information, expropriation fears, or more
importantly subject to discriminatory taxation. It follows that the
existence of such barriers will constrain portfolio choice by affecting
the de facto international investment opportunity set facing investors.
Therefore, the resulting optimal international portfolio allocation
could well be very different from that under perfect integration. In
other words, barriers such as discriminatory taxation of foreign invest-
ments can segment international financial markets by constraining
portfolio choice.
Given the variety of barriers to international investment, the
challenge for researchers is, therefore, to isolate and quantify important
barriers and then investigate their impact on portfolio behavior and on
asset pricing relationships (Solnik, 1974). For instance, Black (1974) and
Stulz (1981) construct models of international asset pricing where it is
costly for domestic investors to hold foreign securities due to discrimi-
natory taxation. Theoretically, these models come closest to the
Brazilian IOF taxes imposed on foreign investors. Note that in the two
models the barrier may represent a transaction cost, information cost,
or differential taxation. Both models assume that proportional taxation
can represent this cost and use a two-country, single-period model for
analysis. In the Black model, the tax is on an investor's net holdings
(long minus short) of risky foreign assets. Stulz (1981) models taxes
on the absolute value of an investor's long and short holdings of risky
foreign assets. Both models show that the world market portfolio will
not be efficient for any investor in either country. Stulz also shows
that under some conditions the domestic investor's portfolio may
altogether preclude a subset of foreign securities.
Appendix C presents amodified outline of themodel in Stulz (1981)
to help fix ideas. To motivate our empirical analysis in simple terms we
can think of the controls as creating a price wedge in the expected
returns or a tax that drives up the expected return relative to the bench-
mark return under full integration. An increase in expected returns will
result in falling stock prices. In mapping the theory to the data, in an
event study framework, an increase in expected returns and a fall in
stock prices will be reflected in negative cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) in the event windows surrounding capital control announce-
ments. The next subsection describes the methodology.3.1. An event study with stock market data
We use an event-study methodology to examine investors' reaction
to the strengthening orweakening of capital controls.12 If capitalmarkets
are semi-strong form efficient with respect to public information, stock
prices will quickly adjust following an announcement, incorporating
any expected value changes (Andrade et al., 2001).
Event studies in finance and economics examine the reaction of
asset (stock) prices to public news events (see MacKinlay, 1997 for an
excellent survey). In addition, examples of tax applications in event
studies are Cutler (1988) to examine the impact of tax reform and
stock prices and Auerbach and Hassett (2007) to evaluate the impact
of dividend tax cuts on the value of the firm.
Briefly, stock prices are present discounted values of expected future
cash flows where the discount rate or cost of capital a firm faces
depends on the required rate of return investors demand. Stock price
changes in turn reflect changes in discount rates or expected future
cash flows. Stock prices fall if discount rates rise or expected future
cash flows fall. Conversely, stock prices rise if discount rate fall or
expected future cash flows rise. When discount rates and cash flows
move in the same direction, they have offsetting effects—whether
stock prices rise or falls in that case depends onwhich effect dominates.
If markets are semi-strong form efficient, security prices will
immediately reflect the impact of news such as capital controls taxes.
Financialmarket data therefore offer easilymeasurable summary statis-
tics that capture the economic impact of news such as changes in policy
on firm value over relatively high frequencies. It is important to note
that semi-strong form market efficiency also implies that there should
be no tendency for systematically positive or negative returns after
news events, except to the extent that the events alter assets' compen-
sated risk exposures. It is traditional to assume that events have no
effect on such risk exposures implying that the price reaction at the
time of the news event (after controlling for other events occurring at
the same time) is an estimate of the change in fundamental value of
the asset (the expected present value of its dividends, discounted at a
constant rate) implied by the news release.
In the case of capital controls announcements, the fundamental
value of an asset can change because of either compensated risk
exposures (expected returns/discount rates) change as capital controls
taxes impose an international investment barrier (price wedge) or
because dividends/expected future cash flows change. We attempt to
capture the effect of capital controls announcements under the assump-
tion of semi-strong form market efficiency.
Optimally event windows over which news reactions are measured
ought to be short so that other news about events does not contaminate
the measurement of the market's reaction to the particular news event
of interest. Typically, in studies that use daily financial data event
windows range from two–three days to twenty-one days. It is impor-
tant to note that, the stock price reaction or the announcement return
in the event window is a summary statistic of expected changes in the
present discounted value of cash flows for a given firm over the entire
infinite horizon. The connection between stock prices and news there-
fore creates a link between the present and the future (Henry, 2007).
The benchmark model or the estimation window (280 to 30 days
prior to the event) is used to measure the “normal” expected return
using the CAPM. Abnormal returns capture the “unexpected news” or
announcement effect of the policy change (capital controls). A negative
abnormal return implies that either the cost of capital is expected to
increase or cash flows (dividends) are expected to decrease. In either
case a negative abnormal return (AR) suggests that themarket interprets
the “news” of capital controls as an adverse event. These abnormal
returns are cumulated over the eventwindow to arrive at the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs).
Our benchmark regression analysis cumulates abnormal returns
over a two-day window while we corroborate the robustness of our
resultswith alternate eventwindow lengths later in the paper. In partic-
ular, we analyze several windows (two, three, five, eleven, and twenty-
one days) but present results for the two-day windows in our main
specifications as this is the most stringent identification test we can
apply to capture the announcement effect of the capital controls with
less concern about other confounding news events.
Finally, note that if the controls alter the expected value or variance
of the domestic production activities, the impact on a firm's stock price
will depend on two effects: the expected cash flow effect and the
required rate of return or cost of capital effect. A priori, some firms can
benefit from the protectionist variety of capital controls. It is possible
therefore that for these firms expected cash flows increase more than
the rise in the required rate of return such that stock prices rise, and
CARs are positive following the imposition of capital controls. For exam-
ple, exportingfirmsmaybenefit fromprotectionist capital controls if the
exchange rate depreciates and expected future cash flows go up.4. The data and summary statistics
We examine the firm-level abnormal stock return adjusted for
clustering around windows of time surrounding the announcement of
the capital control policy. Stock prices are from Datastream. The market
returns used in the benchmark estimations uses the BOVESPA return
(the most commonly quoted index in Brazil). We also analyze different
broad indices available for different sectors or classes of firms such as
the IBRA index. Asmentioned in the previous subsection, our estimation
period is 280 days before and up until 30 days preceding the event date.
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) sum the abnormal returns over
the event window, with abnormal returns estimated using a market
model with Scholes-Williams betas that make adjustments for the
noise inherent in daily returns data.13 Given that the some of the events
are close in timemaking their estimation windows overlapping in time,
we also conduct the analysis using the estimation window prior to the13 In particular, nonsynchronous trading of securities introduces a potentially serious
econometric problem of errors in variables to estimate the market model with daily
returns data (Scholes and Williams, 1977). To address this problem, Scholes-Williams
betas provide computationally convenient and consistent estimators for themarketmod-
el. Using a standardized value of the cumulative abnormal return, we test the null hypoth-
esis that the return is equal to zero.October 2009 event as the benchmark return in the CAR calculations
for all the following events.
Data about firm characteristics are fromWorldscope and the sample
consists of quarterly data from Q4 2007–Q4 2013. These include the log
of total assets, as a proxy for size and debt to total assets, and short-term
debt to total debt as proxies for liquidity.14 In addition, we construct a
number of measures of external finance dependence beginning with
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure using time-series Brazilian
data. We use the consumer price index (CPI) index to deflate the data.
The firm-level information is matched to export status and the range
of exports using data from the Brazilian Secretary of External Trade
(Secretaria de Comercio Exterior, Secex). The export range is in
U.S. dollars (FOB) and includes firms exporting less than $1 million,
between $1 million and $100 million, and more than $100 million.
Given that coverage of foreign sales data is very poor in the widely
used Worldscope data, access to the proprietary Secex data for exports
is a key differentiator of our study.
4.1. Summary statistics
Fig. 1 depicts the evolution of the BOVESPA index corresponding to
the different capital controls announcements in Table 1. The table
includes the capital controls announcement dates, whether the control
affected inflows of debt or equity, the change in the market return on
the BOVESPA index in the two-day post-announcement period, and a
description of the event.15
Table 2 presents firm-level summary statistics for the firms in
the BOVESPA index that includes prices for the more actively traded
and better representative stocks of the Brazilian stock market. In the
robustness analysis, we also examine the stock price reaction for firms
listed on the alternative IBRA index. Information includes firm size,
exporter status, liquidity, and leverage measures. We report firm size,
operating revenue in real terms, i.e., the nominal values deflated by
the CPI. The data show that the average firm size regarding log total
assets and in real terms. In nominal terms, this roughly translates to
US$10 million at an average exchange rate of 1.9 R$/US$ over the
sample period. The average leverage ratio (debt/assets) is close to 31%
while short-term debt (of less than one year) on average accounts for
about 30% of total debt.
Table 2 also reports summary statistics for log assets and operating
revenues for the full sample, exporting, and non-exporting firms Note
that non-exporting firms include large utilities and financial services
firms such as large banks. About 40% of the firms in the sample are
exporters with half of them belonging to the largest exporting group
(more than $100 million). Panel B reports summary statistics for
exporting firms and suggests that exporting firms are on average
slightly larger than non-exporting firms in Panel C. Exporting firms a
slightly higher debt-to-assets ratio than non-exporting firms (33%
versus 30% respectively) and less short-term debt (26% to 33%).
5. Results
5.1. Abnormal returns and firm characteristics
Before turning to the regression analysis, a visual inspection of our
data is useful. To do so Fig. 2a and b graphically present the stock
market's response to capital control announcements. The horizontal
axis is in event time for four days before and four days after the capital
controls announcement dates. Fig. 2a shows the abnormal returns14 Data availability varies across firms. In Brazil, with the exception of media firms, all
firms are available to foreign investors. While the government retains some shares in
state-owned firms that were privatized such as Petrobras, foreign investment is allowed
in these firms.
15 The table also includes the Decree number associated with the change in the IOF. As
mentioned in footnote 9, the table excludes the removal of controls onOctober 22nd2008.
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Fig. 1. Brazil's Bovespa and capital control events (daily).
Source: Datastream and authors construction using capital control event dates.averaged across firms by event. The abnormal returns were first aver-
aged across firms for each event in event time [t = −3, t = +3] and
then averaged across events. Fig. 2b presents the results cumulated
across firms by event and then averaged across events also in event
time. Both figures visually confirm that on average in the aftermath of
capital controls announcements abnormal returns are negative.
The formal regression analysis in Table 3 uses panel data (by firm
and event) where the dependent variable is the firm-specific two-day
cumulative abnormal return. The basic regression specification is:
CARit ¼ Constant þ FirmControlsit þ εit; ð1ÞTable 2
Summary statistics.
Notes: Financial figures are from Q4 2007which is the last quarter prior to the announce-
ment regarding the introduction of capital controls on 3/12/2008. Summary statistics
correspond to benchmark estimation in Table 3. Nominal variables at the firm-level are
divided by the Consumer Price Index (×100). The sample period is Q4-2007–Q4-2013.
Total Assets and Operating Revenue are in real terms deflated by the CPI. The average
USD/Reais exchange rate from 2008 to 2013 was 1.897 R$/US$.
Sources: Datastream for firm-level data and Secex for export data.
Observations Mean Std. dev. Median
Panel A: All firms
Total assets (log) 1016 16.697 1.633 16.497
Debt/assets (%) 1006 31.433 15.416 29.150
Short-term debt/debt (%) 928 30.137 24.102 22.774
Operating revenue (millions of R$) 1013 1.011 2.917 0.278
Exporter dummy 1016 0.419 0.494 0.000
Panel B: Exporting firms
Total assets (log) 426 16.781 1.590 16.872
Debt/assets (%) 424 32.933 16.360 29.135
Short-term debt/debt (%) 410 26.095 20.051 19.321
Operating revenue (millions of R$) 424 1.580 3.783 0.313
Panel C: Non-exporting firms
Total assets (log) 590 16.636 1.663 16.298
Debt/assets (%) 582 30.341 14.607 29.170
Short-term debt/debt (%) 518 33.335 26.464 25.109
Operating revenue (millions of R$) 589 0.601 1.987 0.266where CARit is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the event
window t.We use a two-day eventwindow as our benchmark specifica-
tion. The constant term captures the impact of the announcement on
average returns, and firm controls include an observable set of firm-
specific characteristics such as size, leverage, and so on.
Our methodology is as follows. We construct a CAR for each firm
around each event date. We stack the firms to create a panel of firm-
event observations. In the benchmark estimation we use both tighten-
ing and loosening announcements. Subsequent estimations include a
looseningdummy to see if themarket responds differentially depending
on the direction of the change in capital controls. We also conduct the
estimations by including event dummies.
Since the association between abnormal returns and firm character-
istics could be explained by other documented regularities, we compute
bootstrapped p-values of the OLS regression using themethod proposed
in Busse and Green (2002). The results report the OLS bootstrapped
one-tailed p-values.16
Measures of two-day CARs using Scholes-Williams betas suggest a
significant decline in stock returns surrounding the capital control
announcements consistent with an increase in the cost of capital for
firms listed on the BOVESPA (Table 3, Column 1). Quantitatively CARs
fall by about −0.28% on average over a two-day window for the full
sample of events in Table 1. The effect is statistically significant at the
1% level.
Column 2 includes a proxy for firm size in terms of (log) total assets
lagged by one quarter. Controlling for size, the coefficient on the
constant term suggests that the CARs fall on average by a quantitatively
significant −2.66% at the 1% level, which is an order of magnitude
higher than the simple regression in Column 1 that does not control
for firm size. This suggests that firm size captures an important dimen-
sion of underlying heterogeneity at the firm level. The size variable
measured by the lagged value of total firm assets has a positive and
significant effect on abnormal returns at the 1% level. The results from
the specification in Column 2, suggest that large firms were somewhat



















































Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Fig. 2. a: Capital control announcements: abnormal returns in event time (daily). b: Capital control announcements: average abnormal returns (cumulated across firms by event).To get a sense of the quantitative importance of the estimates we
further explore the importance of size as a key dimension of underlying
firm-level heterogeneity. We examine the effects of a one standard
deviation increase in firm size on the magnitude of the CAR. The mean
of log assets, our measure of firm size, is 16.69. A firm whose assets
are one standard deviation larger than the mean firm has a log asset
value of 18.33 (i.e., the logged asset value of a firm with size (μ + σ)).
If we turn to column (2) in Table 3, the coefficient estimates for the
mean sized firm give a fitted two-day CAR of −0.29% (−0.0266 +
0.00142 ∗ μLog Assets). Similarly, for a firm that is one standard deviation
larger than an average-sized firm the fitted two-day CAR equal to
−0.057%. Comparing the two fitted CAR values suggests that a one
standard deviation increase in firm size results in a less negative value
for the two-day CAR—the difference is about −80.25%. The net effect
of firm size therefore appears quantitatively significant. While the
overall effect is still negative for a one standard deviation increase in
firm size, the magnitude of the adverse impact appears reduced. As a
benchmark for comparison of return magnitudes, the average daily
raw return for the sample period is +0.059%.
The rows at the bottom of Table 3 report the fitted CARs (and
standard errors) for firms at P25, P50, the mean, P75, P90 and P95.
Consistentwith the positive coefficient on log assets, note that the fitted
CAR valuesmonotonically increase aswe go from the bottom end of the
distribution of firm size to the biggest firms. Moreover the signs on the
fitted mean CAR values remain negative till the P75 for firm size and
become positive for firms with size in the P90 and above suggesting
once again that the largest firms were somewhat shielded from the
adverse effects of the capital controls policies. Column (2) fitted CAR
values in the 95% confidence interval at P75 range from [+0.002%,−0.39%]. The upper bound of the confidence interval therefore contains
marginally positive values. The 95% confidence interval at P95 ranges
from [+0.57, −0.16%] suggesting that the lower bound for the very
largest firms also contains negative values. Confidence interval ranges
for firm sizes belowP75 are uniformly negative confirming that the neg-
ative burden of capital controls policies appears to disproportionately
affect smaller listed firms.
Including controls for leverage, such as debt to total assets in Column
3 and short-termdebt to total debt, does not appear to have a significant
effect on the abnormal returns. Columns 3 and 4 corroborate that, on
average, CARs are significantly negative at the 1% level, while firm size
somewhat mitigates the negative effect on abnormal returns in the
immediate aftermath of capital control announcements.
Column 5 includes a variable that takes into account a firm's
exporter status. The evidence suggests that the average effect of the
capital controls announcement is negative and significant at the 1%
level while the coefficient on exporter status is positive and significant
at the 5% level. Two factors namely internal capital markets and
improved competitiveness could have shielded exporting firms from
the adverse impact of the controls. First, there could be cross-sectional
variation in the cost of capital impact as well as credit constraints
depending on firm characteristics. For instance, we saw earlier that
large firms may be somewhat shielded from the adverse cost of capital
impact. This may be because large firms can rely on internal capital
markets or other sources of financing to fund their operations in
the aftermath of controls. Similarly, exporting firms, especially the
larger firms, may have access to internal capital markets or foreign
currency proceeds and therefore, less reliant on foreign capital
investments.
Table 3
Post-capital control announcement returns are significantly negative.
Notes: The sample includes all events and the firms on the Bovespa exchange. Cumulative abnormal returns aremeasured over a two-daywindow using Scholes-Williams betas. Log total
assets, debt to assets and short term debt to total debt all correspond to one year lagged values and are fromWorldscope. Export data are matched from Secex. Bootstrapped standard
errors in parenthesis.
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (Scholes-Williams)
All events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant −0.00277⁎⁎⁎ −0.0266⁎⁎⁎ −0.0263⁎⁎ −0.0229⁎⁎ −0.0273⁎⁎⁎ −0.0307⁎⁎⁎
(0.0011) (0.0078) (0.0128) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0099)
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
0.00142⁎⁎⁎ 0.00133⁎ 0.00122⁎⁎ 0.00137⁎⁎⁎ 0.00158⁎⁎⁎











Export b $1 mil −0.00299
(0.0038)
Export $1 mil–$100 mil 0.00765‡
(0.0050)
Export N $100 mil 0.00258
(0.0021)
Observations 1078 1016 1006 928 1016 1016
R-squared 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.012
Panel B: Fitted CARs and standard errors
Column (2) Column (5)
Log total assets Size Size and exporter Size and non-exporter
(lag 1y) Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e.
P25 −0.0042 0.0013 −0.0017 0.0022 −0.0058 0.0010
P50 −0.0031 0.0010 −0.0004 0.0020 −0.0049 0.0010
Mean −0.0028 0.0010 −0.0005 0.0019 −0.0045 0.0010
P75 −0.0020 0.0009 0.0005 0.0019 −0.0040 0.0011
P90 0.0011 0.0014 0.0028 0.0021 −0.0002 0.0022
P95 0.0020 0.0017 0.0034 0.0022 0.0005 0.0025
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.Second, to the extent that the controls can curb the currency
appreciation and improve the competitiveness of exporting firms, the
expected future cash flows of the exporting firms can improve in the
aftermath of the controls.17 Exporters could be in an improved compet-
itive position internationally, which drives up their expected cash flows
and abnormal returns. The second explanation is consistent with the
argument that as a by-product of prudential capital controls designed
to mitigate the volatility of foreign capital inflows and manage endoge-
nous systemic risk, a depreciated currency may benefit exporting firms
in the country imposing the controls. Given that Column 5, includes
controls for both firm size and exporter status, the coefficient estimates
suggests that large exporting firms are likely to be less negatively
affected by the capital controls policy.
Column 6 further explores the impact of the capital controls
announcement on exporting firms by size groups. It is interesting to
note that smaller exporters in the b$1 million revenue bin do not
experience significant returns. The coefficients on exporting firms in
the $1–$100 million revenue bin and the largest revenues, i.e., in the
N$100 million in revenues are positive and statistically significant at
the 15% level for the second bin suggesting that controlling for firm
size, the magnitude of the export revenues may also matter.17 Note that although the policy can in principle tax trade credits, the IOFwas set to zero.
See https://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/Legislacao/Decretos/2008/dec6339.htm.The rows below the Table 3 show that the pattern of negative fitted
CAR values for the specification in Column 2 (that controls for firm size)
holds for firms in all size percentile bins barring the very largest firms in
the P95 percentile. The pattern of negative fitted CARs for the specifica-
tion in Column 5 (that controls for size and exporter status) holds
for exporters in all size bins except for the largest exporters in the
P90 and above size category. For non-exporters, we report negative
fitted CARs for all size bins including the very largest firms. Overall,
the evidence suggests that large firms with large export revenues
are somewhat shielded from the negative effects of capital controls
announcements.
A stated goal of the controls was to protect the tradable firms from
being hurt by an overvalued exchange rate. Therefore some may argue
that the net effect of the controls for an exporting firm is a positive
CAR, at the expense of a negative CAR for non-exporting firms is a
welcome distributional development of the policy (equivalent to
“taxing” somefirms to “subsidize” exporters). However, our results sug-
gest that it is the large firms and large, exporting firms that are the less
adversely affected by the capital controls policies—in fact, the estimated
coefficients suggest that the overall impact on fitted CARs are positive
and significant for the largest firms and the largest exporters. In a devel-
oping country like Brazil, it is not clear how subsidizing large exporters
at the expense of taxing small firms including smaller exporters and in
particular small, non-exporters would be viewed as a desirable. We
therefore take the view that the net positive effects on large firms and
large exporters are an unintended consequence of the capital controls
policies.
Also note that systematic firm-level financial data for small, unlisted
firms are not available for these Brazilianfirms. Disclosure requirements
for listed firms provide access to firm-level financial statements. Fur-
ther, our empirical methodology relies on estimating cumulative
abnormal returns based on stock market data that are also only
available for firms that are listed on the stock market. Our results
show that from the listed sample, the firms that are most adversely
affected are the small, non-exporters. This evidence therefore also
suggests that our results may suffer from attenuation bias in that we
do not have the smallest, unlisted firms in the sample. In some sense
one can argue that our evidence provides a lower bound estimate
of the adverse impact of capital controls on the cost of capital for
Brazilian firms.5.2. Credit constraints and abnormal returns
Next, we examine the hypothesis of credit constraints and external
finance dependence. Moving beyond the overall cost of capital, there
is another factor to consider in the context of liquidity or credit-
constrained firms. Here, the distinction between the differential cost
of external and internal finance can also play a role. By affecting the
cost of external finance, the imposition of capital controls could affect
firms that are more dependent on external finance to fund their
investment opportunities. The test then is whether firms (or industries)
dependent on external finance are more adversely affected by capital
controls as measured by the market's reaction to the policy announce-
ment. Consistent with arguments in Rajan and Zingales (1998), there
are two advantages to this simple test: it focuses on the mechanism
by which the cost of finance affects a firm's growth prospects, thus
providing a stronger test of causality, and it can correct for industry
effects.
Moreover, liquidity constraints at the firm level may depend on
external finance dependence, firm size, and export status. Firms with
easier access to external finance or greater access to low-cost funds
may be able to overcome the barriers associated with any fixed costs
of production (Chaney, 2013). To proxy for a firm's dependence on
external finance, we measure the extent of investment expenditures
that cannot be financed through internal cash flows generated by the
firm using time-series Brazilian data. In other words, we construct the
Rajan and Zingales (1998) external finance dependence measure
using Brazilian firm data. Accordingly, a firm's dependence on external
finance is defined as capital expenditures minus cash flow from opera-
tions divided by capital expenditures. Table 4 presents the results.
Column 1 of Table 4 (Panel A) shows the benchmark regression,
which includes controls for firm size, exporter status, and external
finance dependence. Consistent with the hypothesis that firms that
are more dependent on external finance may be affected adversely by
capital controls, the coefficient on the external finance dependence
variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. Average CARs are
negative and significant, but firm size and exporter status—consistent
with results in previous tables—have positive and significant
coefficients.
Panel B of Table 4 reports fitted CARs for the results in column 1
conditioning on external finance dependence, size and exporter status.
The fitted CARs suggest that conditioning on size, exporters with high
external finance dependence (P75) have a significantly more negative
CAR compared to exporters withmedian (P50) external finance depen-
dence. For non-exporters the fitted CARs are consistentlymore negative
across external finance bins. For example in the high external finance
(P75) bin, the fitted CAR value for exporters is −0.37% while it is
−0.63% for non-exporters over the two-day event window.
Column 2 of Panel A disaggregates exporting firms by the size of
their exporting revenues. External finance dependence continues to
have a negative and significant effect on abnormal returns. The evidence
also suggests thatwhile the smallest exporters (with revenues less than$1 million) are negatively affected, the larger exporters appear to be
somewhat shielded.
Columns 3–8 examine different measures for external finance
dependence. Columns 3 and 4 include a dummy variable to distinguish
between firms with high and low finance dependence relative to the
mean. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to manufacturing firms
and classify them according to high and low external finance depen-
dence following the Rajan and Zingales (1998) classification. The result
that external finance dependence has a negative and significant effect
of abnormal returns is robust to these alternative measures. Turning
to the quantitative significance of the coefficients in Panel B of Table 4,
we see that for firm's with an external finance dependence that exceeds
the mean, the median sized non-exporters (P50) are affected more
adversely than the larger non-exporters (P75) with fitted CARs of
−0.62% and −0.57%, respectively. Large exporters (P75) have positive
fitted two-day CARs across external finance dependence measures
above and below the mean. Manufacturing firms with high external
finance dependence are affected more adversely for both exporters
and non-exporters at the P50 and P75 size percentiles.
Also, note that in the economy, some firms rely more on equity
financing (relative to debt financing) than others. This is reflected, for
example, in the substantial degree of variation in leverage across
sectors. Given that some events impose controls on debt inflows while
other events impose control on equity inflows, it is interesting to
analyze whether firms that rely more on equity financing are affected
more by equity controls, and firms that rely more on debt financing
are affected more by debt controls.
To do so, we constructed a measure of equity dependence following
the Rajan and Zingales measure as the amount of common equity as a
fraction of total capital expenditures. The results suggest that the
cumulative abnormal returns are inversely correlated with the equity
finance dependence but not in a statistically significant manner
(Table 4, Columns 7 and 8).
5.3. Debt versus equity events
Firms rely on both debt and equity financing. The overall cost of
capital embodies the risk-free rate (based on debt instruments) and
the equity premium. If the tax on debt instruments drives up the risk-
free rate or implicitly the average cost of capital, the cost of capital
increases and holding expected future cash flows constant, drives
down the stock price manifested in negative firm-level CARs. We
therefore expect that the stock market could react to controls on debt
instruments as well as equity instruments.
The recent Brazilian capital controls differentiate between debt and
equity related measures. Table 5 displays regression specifications that
include a dummy variable that takes a value of one for equity events
and zero for debt-related controls events. The pattern of results holds
with highly significant negative CARs when capital control measures
are announced. The coefficient on the constant is significant at the 1%
level, controlling for size and exporter status (Columns 1 and 2). The
equity dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
Controls on equity flows display a more negative announcement effect
compared to controls on debt. A similar pattern obtains in Columns 3
and 4 that include controls for external finance dependence.
Fitted CARs in Panel B show that for equity-related controls,
exporters in all size percentiles with the exception of the 95th-
percentile are negative ranging from−0.46% for the smallest exporters
(P25) to −0.01% for the larger exporters (P90). The magnitude of the
negative CARs declines as we go from the 25th-percentile to the 90th-
percentile of firm size. For non-exporters, the magnitude of negative
CARs is much higher ranging from −0.88% for the smallest (P25) to
−0.24% for the largest (P95) non-exporters for equity related controls.
For debt-related controls, while the smallest exporters are marginally
negatively affected, exporters in all other size bins display positive
CARs ranging from 0.13% to 0.51%. For non-exporters, all but the largest
Table 4
External finance-dependent firms are more negatively impacted by capital controls.
Notes: The sample includes all events and thefirms on the Bovespa exchange. Cumulative Abnormal Returns aremeasured over a two-daywindowusing Scholes-Williams betas. Log total
assets corresponds to lagged values (to the closest year) taken from Worldscope. In (1)–(2), external finance dependence (ExtFinDep) is measured as the difference between capital
expenditures and cash flows divided by capital expenditures as in Rajan and Zingales (1998); in (3)–(4) a dummy is used if ExtFinDep is greater than the mean of ExtFinDep; in
(5)–(6) a dummy is used for high ExtFinDepmanufacturing industries; in (7)–(8) common equity to capital expenditures is created from Capital IQ. Export data arematched from Secex.
Bootstrapped standard errors.
Sources: Datastream, Capital IQ, and Secex.
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (Scholes-Williams)
All events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant −0.0266⁎⁎⁎ −0.0300⁎⁎⁎ −0.0186⁎ −0.0220⁎⁎ −0.0191 −0.0322⁎⁎ −0.0305⁎⁎⁎ −0.0347⁎⁎⁎
(0.0094) (0.0085) (0.0107) (0.0098) (0.0180) (0.0129) (0.0088) (0.0107)
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
0.00134⁎⁎ 0.00154⁎⁎⁎ 0.00108⁎ 0.00126⁎⁎ 0.0015 0.00236⁎⁎⁎ 0.00151⁎⁎⁎ 0.00177⁎⁎⁎
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Exporter 0.00365⁎⁎ 0.00509⁎⁎ (0.0033) 0.00496⁎⁎
(0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0045) (0.0022)
Export b $1 mil (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0064) (0.0021)
(0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0056) (0.0049)
Export $1 mil–$100 mil 0.00751⁎ 0.00842⁎⁎ (0.0003) 0.00995‡
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0064)
Export N $100 mil 0.0025 0.00412⁎ −0.00649⁎ 0.00363⁎













Common equity/CapEx −0.000002 −0.000002
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 999 999 993 993 494 494 940 940
R-squared 0.008 0.012 0.01 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.011 0.016
Panel B: Fitted CARs and standard errors
Column (1)
Ext. fin. dep. Export = 1 Export = 0
(lag 1y) Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e.
P50 −0.0003 0.0019 −0.0046 0.0010
P75 −0.0037 0.0027 −0.0063 0.0012
Log total assets Export = 1 Export = 0
(lag 1y) Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e.
P50 −0.0004 0.0019 −0.0047 0.0010
P75 0.0005 0.0019 −0.0039 0.0010
Column (3) Column (5)
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
ExtFinDep ≥ mean & Export = 1 ExtFinDep ≥ mean & Export = 0 High ExtFinDep (Mfg.) & Export = 1 High ExtFinDep (Mfg.) & Export = 0
Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e.
P50 −0.0004 0.0020 −0.0062 0.0013 −0.0048 0.0017 −0.0029 0.0021
P75 0.0003 0.0019 −0.0057 0.0014 −0.0036 0.0015 −0.0022 0.0021
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
ExtFinDep ≤ mean & Export = 1 ExtFinDep ≤ mean & Export = 0 Low ExtFinDep (Mfg.) & Export = 1 Low ExtFinDep (Mfg.) & Export = 0
Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e.
P50 0.0028 0.0033 −0.0004 0.0011 0.0038 0.0027 0.0078 0.0033
P75 0.0033 0.0031 0.0032 0.0018 0.0045 0.0025 0.0079 0.0033
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.exporters (NP90) display negative fitted two-day CARs ranging from
−0.41% to −0.25%.
There are two explanations that can help interpret the result that
controls on equity are associated with significantly more negative
CARs than controls on debt. The first explanation relates to the fact
that while Brazil historically experimented with the IOF tax exclusively
on debtflows such as in the 1990s, extending the purview to include eq-
uity instruments was done for the very first time in October 2009 (seeGoldfajn and Minella, 2007). The market's reaction may, therefore, be
capturing the element of surprise or unexpected nature of the policy
change to include equity flows.
Second, controls on debt flowsmay serve to reduce financial vulner-
ability given that debt is a non-contingent claim that can generate
systemic risk. Since debt does not embody the risk-sharing aspects
of international equity flows, excessive reliance on external debt
(especially foreign-currency denominated bank loans that generate
Table 5
The market reaction is different for controls on debt vs. equity.
Notes: The sample includes all events and the firms on the Bovespa exchange. Cumulative
abnormal returns aremeasured over a two-daywindowusing Scholes-Williams betas. Log
total assets correspond to one year lagged values from Worldscope. External finance de-
pendence (ExtFinDep) is measured as the difference between capital expenditures and
cash flows divided by capital expenditures as in Rajan and Zingales (1998). Export data
are matched from Secex. Equity is a dummy for equity events. Bootstrapped standard er-
rors in columns (1)–(4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (Scholes-Williams)
All events
Constant −0.0258⁎⁎⁎ −0.0292⁎⁎⁎ −0.0251⁎⁎⁎ −0.0285⁎⁎⁎
(0.0099) (0.0087) (0.0091) (0.0088)
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
0.00137⁎⁎ 0.00158⁎⁎⁎ 0.00134⁎⁎ 0.00154⁎⁎⁎









Export b $1 mil −0.00283 −0.00297
(0.0049) (0.0040)
Export $1 mil–$100 mil 0.00778⁎ 0.00762⁎
(0.0046) (0.0046)
Export N $100 mil 0.00268 0.00259‡
(0.0022) (0.0017)
Equity −0.00449⁎⁎ −0.00449⁎⁎ −0.00434⁎ −0.00434⁎⁎
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0020)
Observations 1016 1016 999 999
R-squared 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.015




Equity = 1 & export = 1 Equity = 1 & Export = 0
Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e.
P25 −0.0046 0.0018 −0.0088 0.0017
P50 −0.0033 0.0016 −0.0079 0.0017
Mean −0.0033 0.0016 −0.0074 0.0018
P75 −0.0023 0.0015 −0.0069 0.0019
P90 −0.0001 0.0015 −0.0028 0.0027
P95 0.0006 0.0015 −0.0024 0.0027
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
Equity = 0 & Export = 1 Equity = 0 & Export = 0
Fitted CARs s.e. Fitted CARs s.e.
P25 −0.0001 0.0026 −0.0041 0.0013
P50 0.0013 0.0023 −0.0034 0.0013
Mean 0.0012 0.0023 −0.0029 0.0012
P75 0.0021 0.0021 −0.0025 0.0012
P90 0.0044 0.0018 0.0010 0.0016
P95 0.0051 0.0018 0.0021 0.0019
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.currency mismatches on balance sheets) can cause financial distress as
we have seen inmany an emerging-market crisis. Therefore, themarket
may perceive controls on debt as a desirablemeans to curb systemic risk
or perform a macro-prudential function with respect to the stability of
the financial system.
We also implemented regression specifications (not reported) with
(i) an equity event dummy, external finance dependence and an
interaction term between equity finance dependence and the equity
event dummy and (ii) a debt event dummy, debt finance dependence
measured by leverage as well as a debt financing as a fraction of capital
expenditures and an interaction term. While the coefficient on the
equity finance dependence is negative and significant, the interaction
term is not significant. In contrast for debt dependence, the debt finance
measure is not significant while the interaction term is negative and
significant.We interpret these results as providing corroborative evidence
for our main results about the inverse relationship between CARs sur-
rounding capital control announcements and the external finance de-
pendence characteristic of firms. However, these additional results
must be interpreted with caution, for, given the number of events, the
power of these tests is not very high. An additional caveat is that some
eventswere applied to both debt and equity instruments and, therefore,
may be interferingwith clean identification when the dummy variables
(equity event, debt event) are included in a pooled regression setting.
The results in Tables 3–5 perhaps also suggest that themarket views
the implementation of capital controls as being in a different or new
“capital-controls regime”. Given the variation in the instruments that
fell under the purview of these controls, the fact that they were put on
(March 2008), taken off (October 2008), put on again (October 2009)
and taken off again (2012) and the consistently robust negative and
significant CARs across a broad range of specifications suggests that
overall the market views these policy changes negatively.
5.4. Identifying the mechanism
The evidence suggests that the decline in CARs following the capital
control announcements is consistent with an increase in the cost of
capital. To provide corroborating evidence we examine the change in
themarket interest rates in response to capital controls announcements
as a mechanism through which there is an increase in the economy-
wide cost of capital. Data on daily interest rates for the one-year, two-
year and five-year interest rates are from Bloomberg.
Table 6A presents pooled regressions across the events to quantify the
impact on interest rates over a two-day and three daywindow relative to
the day before the announcement. While we find evidence of an increase
in market rates (3.25 basis points) at the one-year horizon the effects are
much stronger in magnitude for the five-year interest rates. The regres-
sion estimates suggest that on average five-year market interest rates
rise by 11.8 basis points. The increase is statistically significant at the 5%
level of significance. The more muted response of the one-year rate may
be the result of it being a direct instrument of monetary policy or the pol-
icy rate. The term-structure effects are however more direct measures of
themarket's response to the unexpected capital controls announcements.
It isworthnoting that these interest rates increase against the backdrop of
quantitative easing in the US and other developed countries that put
downward pressure on the world interest rate.
Additionally, Hail and Leuz (2009) present an implied cost of capital
methodology using various techniques of accounting-based models of
the clean-surplus relation. We follow their methodology and use the
modified price-earnings growth (PEG) ratio model by Easton (2004)
as the basis for analysis. Here,





Pt is each firm's stock price on the day of the event, obtained
from Datastream.
x̂tþ1 is each firm's forecasted EPS for the year after the event,
obtained from IBES.
x̂tþ2 is each firm's forecasted EPS for two years after the event,
obtained from IBES.
d̂tþ1 is each firm's forecasted DPS (dividends per share) for the
year after the event, obtained from IBES.
rPEG is each firm's estimated cost of capital, for which we solve.
Since our data varies by firm and by event, we have a maximum
of 69 ∗ 15 = 1035 unique observations. We obtained data from IBES
calculated EPS forecasts for three different-length windows both before
Table 6A
Interest rates, exchange rates, and cost of capital post-capital control announcements.
Notes: Change in the 1-year and 5-years interest rates, 2 and 3 days after the pre-announcement date in columns (1)–(4). Percentage change in the exchange rate Brazilian Real to U.S.
dollar at 2 and 3 days after announcement date in columns (5)–(6). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Sources: BM&F, Bovespa, and Bloomberg.
Changes in interest rates and exchange rate post-capital control announcements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest rates Exchange rate
1-year 1-year 5-year 5-year % change % change
[t − 1,t + 2] [t − 1,t + 3] [t − 1,t + 2] [t − 1,t + 3] [t + 2] [t + 3]
All Events
Constant 0.0095 0.0325⁎⁎⁎ 0.0724‡ 0.118⁎⁎ −0.00256⁎ −0.000687
(0.0369) (0.0444) (0.0455) (0.0540) (0.0034) (0.0035)
Obs. 16 16 16 16 16 16
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.and after the event, leading to six different observations per firm-event.
Post-eventwindows,we have 14, 21, and 28-daywindows. All forecasts
that were made on the event date or up to 14, 21 or 28 days after the
event are considered in our analysis. If there are multiple forecasts for
a firm-event, they are averaged. For the pre-event window estimates,
forecasts made on the day of the event are not considered, but those
made up to 14, 21, or 28 days before the event are considered. Once
again, if there are multiple forecasts for a firm-event, they are averaged.
Separate resultswere also calculated deflating the forecasts by theCPI of
the quarter the forecast is for. Brazilian CPI data were collected from the
Brazilian Central Bank.
To solve for estimated cost of capital, we use the quadratic formula:
Pt
r2PEG ¼ x̂tþ2 þ rPEG d̂tþ1−x̂tþ1







c ¼ x̂tþ1−x̂tþ2ð Þ;
a ¼ Pt ;
ð3aÞTable 6B
Interest rates, exchange rates, and cost of capital post-capital control announcements.
Notes: Implied cost of capital following Hail and Leuz (2009) and Easton (2004). Data obtained
and Min refer to root values over the relevant 14-day or 21-day window. Log total assets cor
matched from Secex. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3)
Max (14 days) Min (14 da








Export b $1 mil 0.0625
(0.577)
Export $1 mil–$100 mil −0.455‡
(0.299)
Export N $100 mil −0.503⁎
(0.305)
Post-event dummy 0.0687 0.0674 0.0740⁎
(0.050) (0.049) (0.044)
Observations 913 913 878
R-squared 0.017 0.023 0.017
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.b ¼ −d̂tþ1; ð3bÞ
Since the quadratic equation yields two roots, Eqs. (3a) and (3b),
roots were classified into two groups: minimum and maximum. Both
were used in the estimation.
We conduct the analysis in two steps. First, we compute the cost
of capital before and after the event using the earnings forecasts
from IBES for 14, 21, 28 day windows before and after the event. We
conducted a simple t-test of means and find that the cost of capital is
significantly higher at the 10% level in the 14-day window for both the
maximum and minimum root values.
Second, to test whether the cost of capital increases after the event,
we ran a series of regression specifications with the cost of capital
as the dependent variable calculated with data from the 14, 21, and
28-day windows with both maximum and minimum root values.
Table 6B shows the results. The results in Columns 3 to 8 show that
the post-event dummy is positive and statistically significant at the
10% level of significance. The specifications control for both firm sizefrom IBES are calculated for different-lengthwindows both before and after the event. Max
responds to lagged values (to the closest year) taken from Worldscope. Export data are
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cost of capital
ys) Max (21 days) Min (21 days)
−0.439⁎⁎ −0.203 −0.371 −0.113 −0.276
(0.872) (0.664) (0.786) (0.664) (0.781)
0.0796 0.0605 0.0706 0.0559 0.0657









0.0724⁎ 0.0590⁎ 0.0626⁎ 0.0612⁎ 0.0649⁎
(0.042) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
878 1050 1050 1010 1010
0.023 0.017 0.023 0.016 0.022
and exporter status and suggest that the cost of capital goes up signifi-
cantly following capital control announcements. The post-event
dummy is positive but not statistically significant in the 28-daywindow
(not reported). The evidence also suggests that the effects of announce-
ments are smaller for exporting firms.
To see how the exchange rate reacts to the capital control announce-
ments we use daily Real/dollar exchange rate data from Bloomberg.
Columns (7) and (8) in Table 6A show the results. The coefficients on
the exchange rate variable are negative but not statistically significant.
A negative coefficient suggests exchange rate depreciation consistent
with the motivation behind capital controls to curb currency apprecia-
tion by stemming the inflow of foreign capital. However, the lack of
statistical significance precludes us from drawing robust inference
from the result.
It is worth noting that over the sample period during which the
capital controls were imposed, the Real steadily appreciated between
January 2007 and July 2008 and, despite a brief period of depreciation
during the onset of the Global Financial crisis, continued to appreciate
between January 2009 and July 2011. By the first quarter of 2011, the
exchange rate stood at R$1.6 against the U.S. dollar, and Mantega,
Brazil's financeminister, blamed the currency appreciation on incoming
foreign capital originating in developed markets. In particular, he
focused his criticism on theUnited States, citing that quantitative easing
spurred an excessive influx of foreign capital into Brazil. Mantega stated,
“The advanced countries are still running expansionist monetary
policies…. The developed world is taking longer to recover than
expected and this means their currencies are still devaluing, which is
causing the overvaluation of the Real.”
An alternative view amongst international policy makers
conjectured the onset of the “currency wars” on China's undervalued
currency that had an adverse impact on the export prospects of otherTable 7
Robustness: capital controls, alternative indices, and event windows.





Panel A: All events
2 day −0.00277⁎⁎ −0.00294⁎⁎⁎ −0.0035
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012)
2 day (prior) 0.000867 −0.00121 0.0106⁎⁎
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012)
3 day −0.000706 −0.00225⁎ 0.00621⁎
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Observations 1078 1078 1078
Panel B: Debt events
2 day −0.00195‡ −0.00205⁎ −0.0029
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0016)
2 day (prior) 0.00108 −0.00111 0.0114⁎⁎
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0013)
3 day 0.000466 −0.00111 0.00763⁎
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Observations 737 737 737
Panel C: Equity events
2 day −0.00565⁎⁎⁎ −0.00576⁎⁎⁎ −0.0071
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0017)
2 day (prior) 0.000133 −0.00152 0.00853⁎
(0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0018)
3 day −0.00415⁎⁎ −0.00516⁎⁎⁎ −0.0009
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0024)
Observations 406 406 406
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.countries. For example, the Western Hemisphere Director for the IMF,
Nicholas Eyzaguirre suggested, “There is a correlation [between] the
fact that China pegs its currency and pressures on the exchange rate
of Brazil or Peru.” The preceding arguments suggest that while the
imposition of controls may have been motivated by trying to stem the
appreciation of the Real by curbing the inflow of foreign capital from
developed countries such as the United States, alternative international
economic forces such as the undervalued Renminbi may have rendered
such attempts unsuccessful.5.5. Robustness checks and additional tests
We conduct a number of tests to ensure the robustness of our
results. The firm and stock market regressions are estimated for differ-
ent windows and different methodologies for computing returns (raw
returns, CAPM) obtaining similar patterns (Table 7) and for firms listed
on the alternative IBRA stock exchange (Table 7). Note that the correla-
tions between the betas such as Scholes-Williams, standard CAPM, and
so on are very high. The results remain robust.
To the extent that capital controls can drive up the aggregate cost of
capital, the cost of bank financing could also increase affecting small
firms that rely exclusively on bank financing. To examine whether the
source of external financing matters, we control for the share of debt
from banks (Table 8, Panel A, Column 1). The coefficient on the variable
measuring the share of debt by banks is negative but not significant.
Column 2 in Table 8, Panel A reports the results for operating revenue
as a proxy for size. The negative CAR result is robust, and the coefficient
on operating revenues is positive and significant at the 15% level.
The results are also not driven by the IPO of OGX Petróleo e Gás




0⁎⁎⁎ −0.00269⁎⁎⁎ −0.00297⁎⁎⁎ −0.00168⁎⁎
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
⁎ 0.00197⁎⁎⁎ −0.000804 0.0106⁎⁎⁎
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
⁎⁎ −0.000279 −0.00240⁎⁎⁎ 0.00667⁎⁎⁎
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
2029 2029 2029
4⁎ −0.00215⁎⁎⁎ −0.00245⁎⁎ −0.00113‡
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007)
⁎ 0.00249⁎⁎⁎ −0.0003 0.0112⁎⁎⁎
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
⁎⁎ 0.000641 −0.0015 0.00772⁎⁎⁎
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012)
1382 1382 1382
4⁎⁎⁎ −0.00511⁎⁎⁎ −0.00503⁎⁎⁎ −0.00496⁎⁎⁎
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014)
⁎⁎ 0.0011 −0.00143 0.00939⁎⁎⁎
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0016)





Notes: The sample includes all events and the firms on the Bovespa exchange. Cumulative abnormal returns aremeasured over a two-daywindow using Scholes-Williams betas. Log total
assets and operating revenue correspond to lagged one year values fromWorldscope; bank debt/total debt correspond to one quarter lagged values and are fromWorldscope. Export data
(dummy variables) are matched from Secex. External finance dependence is measured as (CE− CF) / CE which is the difference between capital expenditures and cash flows divided by
cash flows as in Rajan and Zingales (1998). Loosening events corresponds to a dummy for events associated with reductions in the IOF. MNCs correspond to firms that belong to a
multinational firm (either Brazilian or foreign). ADRs correspond to firms that issue ADRs on the NYSE. Foreign bond issuance data are from Bloomberg. VO is turnover by volume, NOSH
is number of shares outstanding, MCAP is market capitalization. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cumulative abnormal returns (Scholes-Williams)
Bank debt Operating
revenue
MNCs ADRs Foreign bond
issuance




Constant −0.0302⁎⁎⁎ −0.00466⁎⁎⁎ −0.0212⁎ −0.0305⁎ −0.0609⁎⁎⁎ −0.0267⁎⁎⁎ −0.0268⁎⁎ −0.0267⁎⁎⁎ −0.0266⁎⁎⁎
(0.0113) (0.0012) (0.0108) (0.0174) (0.0156) (0.0086) (0.0113) (0.0093) (0.0101)
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
0.00155⁎⁎ 0.00106⁎ 0.00141 0.00306⁎⁎⁎ 0.00134⁎⁎⁎ 0.00134⁎⁎ 0.00134⁎⁎⁎ 0.00134⁎⁎
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Exporter 0.00324 0.00346‡ 0.00372‡ 0.00610⁎⁎ 0.00584‡ 0.00369‡ 0.00371⁎ 0.00370⁎ 0.00365‡
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0024)
ExtFinDep
(lag 1y)
−0.0022⁎⁎⁎ −0.00006⁎⁎⁎ −0.00006⁎⁎⁎ −0.0337‡ −0.00842 −0.00006⁎⁎⁎ −0.00006⁎⁎⁎ −0.00006⁎⁎⁎ −0.00006⁎⁎⁎
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)




















Observations 824 1011 714 452 309 989 989 989 999
R-squared 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.021 0.035 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Bootstrapped errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.Apotential concern that arises is that thus farwe treat capital control
events of different magnitudes equally. However, themagnitudes of the
changes vary across events. For example, the October 2010 event
increased the IOF tax by 33% more than the March 2008 event. To see
if the effects are stronger for the events in which the changes are larger,
we added event dummies to our baseline pooled regression specifica-
tion (not reported). The results remain robust—on average the overall
effectwhen the event dummy is added to the constant remains negative
and significant.
We also looked at a sample of firms that are subsidiaries of multina-
tional companies either Brazilian-owned (headquarters in Brazil) or
foreign owned (headquarters abroad), obtaining a similar pattern of
results (Table 8, Column 3). Also, note that in November 2009, a tax of
1.5% was imposed on American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) converted
into local stocks. We also examine the impact of capital control
announcements for firms that issue ADRs on the NYSE since a large
fraction (approximately 40%) of Bovespa constituents are secondarily
listed for trading in New York. The coefficient on the constant is
−0.0305 and is significant at the 10% level (Table 8, Column 4).
To identify a mechanism of impact, the ADR result is also related to
the focus on debt and equity stakeholders in the firm via the “bonding”
hypothesis of Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999). This literature considers
global exposures measured through overseas equity issuance and trad-
ing rather than the export channel. By imposing a capital controls tax on
ADRs converted into local stocks, the controls may have introduced an
additional distortion in the ADR market thereby interfering with the
benefits of bonding to markets with strong institutions via listing and
trading ADRs. We examine another subsample of firms that issued
bonds abroad during the period of study in Column 5 of Table 8. Thedata are fromBloomberg and company reports. The patterns of negative
and highly significant coefficients on the constant term and positive and
significant coefficients on size and exporter status as well as negative
and significant coefficients on external finance dependence are robust
in these alternative specifications.
Additionally in unreported results, we estimated the regressions for
debt and equity events separately as there are some events that involve
controls on both debt and equity. Examining the two sets of events
separately therefore provides a cleaner identification and a simple inter-
pretation of the coefficient on the constant. The pattern of results
showed that equity-related controls had a significantly more negative
impact on CARs than debt-related controls. The pattern was consistent
across alternative specifications and t-test ofmeans suggest a statistically
different impact across the debt and equity-related coefficients.
An additional concern is one of market frictions. Brazil's market,
even amongst Bovespa constituents, can be quite illiquid. The validity
of standard CARs can therefore be questioned due to market illiquidity
along with different market rules governing trading. Asynchronous
trading implies that information is differentially incorporated into
shares for larger and smaller stocks, which we interpret as globally
exposed versus purely local. It is plausible that large-exporting firms
may be more efficient at incorporating information than small non-
exporters. While imperfect, we use liquidity measures as a proxy for
transaction costs and asynchronous trading.
Table 8 Columns (6) to (8) include three measures of liquidity from
Datastream: (i) VO/NOSH which is turnover by volume divided by the
number of shares outstanding; (ii) The share turnover ratio (VO ∗ P) /
MV which is the turnover by volume multiplied by the stock price
(as a proxy for turnover by value) divided by the market value; and
Table 9
Robustness: tightening and loosening events.
Notes: Results for tightening capital control announcements in Panel A and loosening capital control announcements in Panel B. The sample includes all thefirms on the Bovespa exchange.
Cumulative abnormal returns are measured over a two-day window using Scholes-Williams betas. Log total assets, debt to assets, and short term debt to total debt all correspond to one
year lagged values and are from Worldscope. Export data are matched from Secex. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cumulative abnormal returns (Scholes-Williams)
Panel A: Tightening events
Constant −0.00286⁎⁎⁎ −0.0227⁎⁎⁎ −0.0216⁎⁎⁎ −0.0201⁎⁎ −0.0236⁎⁎⁎ −0.0258⁎⁎⁎
(0.0008) (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0085)
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
0.00118⁎⁎⁎ 0.00114⁎⁎ 0.000986⁎ 0.00115⁎⁎ 0.00128⁎⁎⁎











Export b $1 mil −0.00238
(0.0039)
Export $1 mil–$100 mil 0.00685⁎
(0.0040)
Export N $100 mil 0.00311
(0.0023)
Observations 733 702 697 622 702 702
R-squared 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.016
Panel B: Loosening events
Constant −0.0026 −0.0361 −0.0377 −0.029 −0.0363 −0.0424‡
(0.0023) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0329) (0.0301) (0.0287)
Log total assets 0.002 0.00174 0.00172 0.00192 0.00228







Export b $1 mil −0.00458
(0.0066)
Export $1 mil–$100 mil 0.0093
(0.0138)
Export N $100 mil 0.00143
(0.0048)
Observations 345 314 309 306 314 314
R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.01
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.
18 To further examine the robustness of the “no response” to loosening events, we re-
estimated the results using an invariant estimationwindowprior to thefirst event. Results
remain robust. For brevity, result not reported but available upon request.(iii) (VO ∗ P) / MC which is the turnover by volume multiplied by the
stock price divided by the market capitalization. Please note that for
Brazilian firms, Datastream carries turnover by volume traded (VO)
but not turnover by value traded (VA). We multiplied VO by the stock
price (P) to get a proxy for VA. The results remain robust to the inclusion
of the liquidity measures.
In Column 9, we differentiate between tightening and loosening
events using a loosening event dummy. The coefficient on the dummy
is negative but not significant. The overall effect on the CARs remains
negative and significant. To further investigate the impact of the removal
of restrictions, Table 9 separates out the tightening and loosening events.
The table shows that for tightening events the pattern of results is
similar to that of the benchmark specification in Table 3. For example,
Column 2 (Table 9, Panel A) which includes a proxy for firm size, the
coefficient on the constant term suggests that the CARs fall on average
by a quantitatively significant−2.27% at the 1% level, an order ofmagni-
tude higher than the simple regression in Column 1 that does not control
for firm size.
For loosening events in contrast, the constant is not significant in any
specification. All other variables that condition for firm characteristics
such as size and exporter status are also not significant. One concernof course is that the number of events and observations is substantially
reduced when limiting to loosening events, which may reduce the
statistical power. With this caveat in mind, we believe that the pattern
may be consistent with the prior that the restrictions were removed
when there is limited demand for Brazilian assets and may explain the
“no response” pattern for the loosening events when considered
separately. The lack of responsemay also be consistentwith the controls
were increasingly tightened before they were gradually removed such
that there is an asymmetry in the market's response to tightening
versus loosening controls.18
We also find that for tightening events the pattern of negative fitted
CAR values for the specification in Column 2 (that controls for firm size)
holds for firms in all size percentile bins barring the very largest firms in
the P95 percentile (not reported). The pattern of negative fitted CARs
for the specification in (Column 5 that controls for size and exporter
19 Some previous noteworthy examples include the Unremunerated Reserve Require-
ments in Chile (1990s), Colombia (1990s, 2007), and Thailand (2006). Arguably, these his-
torical examples do not compare to the level of active experimentation in the recent
Brazilian experience.
20 In contrast to Brazil, other countries, primarily in East Asia, that also applied capital
controls measures to stem the inflow of foreign capital in the aftermath of the GFC did
so in somewhat of a piecemeal manner and primarily focused on the bond market and
to some extent the banking sector. For instance, Taiwan implemented a tax on foreign in-
vestment in time deposits. Korea implemented restrictions on FX derivatives trading,
foreign-currency denominated lending by banks, and curbed the foreign currency liquid-
ity ratio of banks, Indonesia applied one-month time limit on domestic bond investing,
Thailand removed an exemption 15% tax on foreign investors income from domestic
bonds and finally Korea again applied a 14% tax on foreign income on government bonds.status) holds for exporters in all size bins except for the largest
exporters in the P90 and above size category. For non-exporters and
tightening events, we report negative fitted CARs for all size bins
including the very largest firms.
To the extent that we want to isolate the impact of the policies, it is
important to control for global events or changes in global indices that
can drive movements in Brazilian equities Including the S&P500, or a
globalMSCI can help isolate the impact of the events on the cumulative
abnormal returns. We also conducted the estimations with the MSCI
world index as the benchmark market index in a world CAPM frame-
work. Appendix Table 1 presents the results and the patterns are similar
to those documented in the benchmark specification.
Given the concern of overlapping windows contaminating the
estimation of expected returns, we re-estimate the benchmark specifi-
cations in Table 3 using a fixed estimation window. The results are
reported in Appendix Table 2. It is interesting to note that the CARs
are significantly more negative using the invariant window given that
the first controls were put into place given the surge in capital inflows
and against the back drop of a booming stock market. Therefore when
this window is use to estimate the benchmark normal returns, the
abnormal returns in the period following the controls are even more
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, the usual assumption that the error term is random and
uncorrelated across firms requires further discussion. Eq. (1) is estimat-
ed using a panel regression. When aggregating abnormal returns,
typical event studies assume that abnormal returns are not correlated
across firms. Assuming no correlation across firms means that the
covariance between individual firm abnormal returns is zero. Therefore,
standard distributional results may be used to calculate the variance of
aggregated abnormal returns. The assumption is reasonable only if the
event dates for individual firms do not overlap in calendar time.
In the case of a capital controls event, however, all Brazilian firms
share identical event dates. Given that the capital control announce-
ment dates are clustered in time, cross-sectional correlation of returns
may result in biased standard errors and potentially incorrect inferences
(Petersen, 2009). Standard event study methodology is therefore not
appropriate for capital control announcements, since the announce-
ment events are not independent across firms, and the errors from the
estimation of the expected returns are correlated with one another.
The covariances between individual firm abnormal returns may be
non-zero, in which case the standard distributional results no longer
obtain.
Moreover, there is often more than one capital control announce-
ment to consider. To overcome this issue, Petersen (2009) proposes a
methodology that takes into account the correlation in errors across
firms and the possibility for several announcements. We base our test
on this methodology to address the issue of residuals thatmay be corre-
lated across firms or across time in panel data sets, yielding biased OLS
standard errors. In particular, we use two-way clustering by relaxing
the assumption that abnormal returns are not correlated across firms
and time. Specifically, we allow the off-diagonal (covariance) elements
in the variance–covariancematrix to be different from zero. In short, the
clustering procedure produces standard errors that are appropriately
adjusted to reflect the cross-firm and cross-time correlation of abnor-
mal returns. The estimation procedure also corrects for potential
heteroskedasticity across firms. In the interests of brevity, these results
are not reported but a full set of estimations with clustered standard
errors is available from the authors.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of capital controls on firm-level
stock returns using data from Brazil. We focus on Brazil because it has
taken center stage as a country that has implemented a series of exten-
sive controls on capital flows between 2008 and 2013.Unlike previous
capital controls episodes during emerging market financial crisesdesigned to hinder capital flight, Brazil's capital controls were devised
as a macro-prudential measure to stem foreign capital inflows in
the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Brazil also implemented
the controls to forestall currency appreciation whereas historically
emerging market countries implemented capital controls policies to
prevent currency depreciation.19,20
We employ an event-study methodology using stock price and
financial statement data to examine cumulative abnormal returns in
the aftermath of capital controls announcements. The evidence suggests
that there is a significant decline in CARs for Brazilian firms following
the imposition of capital controls on equity flows, consistent with an
increase in the cost of capital. The data also suggest that large firms and
exporting firms are less affected by the controls. However, quantitatively
the data show that the decline in average returns swamps the advantages
that firm size for the firms below the 75th percentile and export status
offer. Moreover, external finance dependent firms aremore adversely af-
fected by the imposition of capital controls. Notably, controls on debt
flows are associated with less negative returns, suggesting that the mar-
ket views controls on equity and debt flows differently.
The findings in the paper have implications for macro-finance
models that focus exclusively on aggregate variables to examine the
optimality of macro-prudential regulation and abstract from heteroge-
neity at the firm level. In particular, the evidence in this paper suggests
that capital controls disproportionately affect small, non-exporting
firms, especially those more dependent on external finance.
A challenge for tackling the long-standing question of the benefits
and costs of open international capital markets is the tension between
generalizable empirical studies based on cross-country data and the
availability of precisely identifiable policy shocks. Our paper has the
advantage thatwe can cleanly identify the implemented capital controls
by type and magnitude for Brazil. We take a step in furthering our
understanding of the effects of capital controls on the real economy.
Future research could bring us yet nearer.Appendix A
The IOF (“imposto sobre operacoes financeiras”, how capital controls
have been enacted and changed) is a “decree”. Under Brazilian system,
a decree ranks below a law and does not require Congress approval. The
Executive can enact and change a decree, and thus the IOF taxes (up to
a maximum established by the law), at any time by the Minister of
Finance.
In Brazil, some taxes, which in principle have a regulatory intent
(regulatory taxes) such as the IOF, gasoline tax, taxes on industrialized
products, can be changed by decree. Other taxes such as the income
tax (IR) have revenues as the main objective, have to be changed by
law, i.e., require Congressional approval. The Tax code (“Codigo
tributário”) law 5172 passed in October 25th, 1966) distinguishes
between taxes that can be changed by decree and those by law.
The tax code can be found at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/
leis/L5172.htm.
The links below show the subsequent reforms to the law:
(i) The IOF was created by LEI No 5.143, October 20th, 1966.
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L5143.htm.
(ii) Ammendment June 21st, 1994.
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8894.htm.
(iii) There were some revisions to the IOF in 2011 (e.g. giving a broader
definition of derivatives, tax treatments) and to include that the
rates of the IOF could be changed (within the maximum limits
allowed by decree) considering the fiscal and monetary goals of
the authorities.
“O Poder Executivo, obedecidos os limites máximos fixados neste artigo,
poderá alterar as alíquotas tendo em vista os objetivos das políticas
monetária e fiscal. (Incluído pela Lei n° 12.543, de 2011)”.
Appendix B
A sample of opinions from different constituents about capital
controls is listed below. Please note that most of these articles are in
Portuguese.
1. The Institute of International Finance (the IIF) criticizes measures
to control capital inflows. Banks complain and criticize the capital
controls policy as short sighted.
http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral-iff-critica-medidas-
para-controlar-entrada-de-capital-imp-703364.
2. The industry chamber FIESP hopes that the measures will contain
appreciation. They argue that the Real appreciation has “devastated”
the industry. They alsoworry that themarketwillfindways to evade
the measures used to contain appreciation.
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/951113-mercado-vai-burlar-
medidas-para-contencao-do-cambio-diz-fiesp.shtml.
3. The head of Bovespa criticizes the tax as Brazilian firm stock




4. Exporters repatriate dollar earnings from abroad. Interestingly, the
article talks about exporters bringing back dollar earnings from
exports to Brazil. Before the controls the earnings were kept abroad.
This may reflect the difficulties in repatriating earnings and the fact




5. Article discusses that the government attitude towards containing




6. Industry associations are once again in favor of the policy to regain
competitiveness eroded by the Real appreciation. The article
suggests that the capital control measures will not have immediateimpact on the exchange rate. This article makes it clear that
exporters don't pay the IOF tax.
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u381325.shtml.
7. Interview with Edemir Pinto, Head of Bovespa against capital con-
trols highlighting foreign investor dependence and the importance
of the stockmarket especially for small andmedium size companies.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3734fa98-0a32-11e1-85ca-00144fe
abdc0.html#ixzz3lwzLBX8x.
8. Edemir Pinto, chief executive officer of BM&FBovespa, met with
Finance Minister Guido Mantega last month in Brasilia to lobby for




9. Brazilian private equity funds are lobbying the government for an ex-
clusion to the recently increased IOF tax.
http://www.abvcap.com.br/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-abvcap.
aspx?c=en-US&id=510.
10. Brazilian private equity funds, known as FIPs, are lobbying the
government for an exclusion to the recently increased IOF tax.
http://www.latinfinance.com/Article/2698320/Brazil-Private-Equity-
Hopes-to-Dodge-New-Tax.html#.VZVs1_lVhBc.
11. “Brazil's largest commodities exporters are now lobbying the
government to roll back the so-called IOF tax, which is applied to
foreign credit and exchange operations…. “We are going to have
to find some solution,”” said Luiz Carlos Carvalho, president of
Brazil's Agribusiness Association, which is pressing the government
to remove or alter the tax.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/30/us-exports-brazil-
financeidUSBRE82T0CV20120330.
12. International investors are outraged over Brazil's “currency war”
with the US and Europe, after Brazil's latest attempt to manage its
currency – by extending the IOF tax on all foreign borrowings –
fanned speculation it will pursue a tighter control over capital
inflows in its economy.…“If Brazilwants to be a real-world country,
it should do real-world things and that includes not jerry-rigging
your currency,” says JimCraige, international fixed-income investor
in Brazil and manager of EM fixed income funds at New York's





We present a modified outline of themodel in Stulz (1981) helps fix
ideas and motivate our empirical analysis. Assume there are two coun-
tries: the domestic country D and the foreign country F. Also assume
that investors in both countries are risk averse and care only about the
expected return and variance of their investment. In an integrated
world capital market with no barriers to international investment the
two countries comprise the global equity market and expand the diver-
sification opportunities for all investors. Since investors can invest in
21 See Stulz (1981) for a detailed derivation.
22 Specifically, qm is a constant, which is a weighted average of unobservable non-
negative numbers, qks chosen such that (5) holds with equality.
23 xm is an N×1vector whose element xim is the fraction of world wealthWw supplied in
the form of risky asset i.each other's stockmarkets, both foreign anddomestic investors bear the
risks associated with domestic production.
Investor k is a domestic (foreign) investor if wewrite k∈D (k∈F). An
asset i is a domestic (foreign) asset if we write i∈D (i∈F). Also, assume
that domestic investors pay a capital controls tax θ on their risky
international investments whereas foreign investors face no barriers
to international investment. If a domestic investor k holds a foreign
risky asset i long, the return is Ri−θ, where Ri is the return of asset i
for a foreign investor and θ, the capital controls tax rate, represents
barriers to international investment.
With the assumption of mean-variance optimization, investors act to
minimize the variance of their portfolios subject to the constraint that
the expected portfolio return is greater than an exogenously given
return Rk. There are N risky assets of which n are domestic assets and
N−n are foreign assets. R is theN× 1 column vector of expected returns
and Σ is an N×N variance-covariance matrix of returns on risky assets.
Let Let xk denote the N×1 vector of shares of wealth investor k holds in
risky assets. If xik=0, investor k does not hold a positive amount of
risky asset i. If e is an N×1 vector which has zeros in the first n rows
(domestic) and ones in the remaining N − n rows, investor k pays
capital controls taxes in the amount of xk′eθWkwhereWk is the investor's
total wealth. Define 1 as an N×1 column vector of ones.
The investor's problem is to minimize the variance of the portfolio
subject to the constraint on the expected return of the portfolio and

















The left-hand side of Eq. (C.1) is the expected return of the portfolio
of investor k, which is defined as the sum of:
(a) the expected return of the investor's holdings of risky assets in
the absence of capital controls taxes (xk′R) less
(b) the capital controls tax on the investor's holdings which is
proportional to the absolute value of the investor's holdings of
foreign risky assets (xk′eθ) plus
(c) the returns on holdings of safe bonds ([1−xk′1]Rf).
If Lk is the Lagrangean function which corresponds to the investor's
optimization problem and if λk is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the constraint given by Eq. (C.1), then the domestic investor's
portfolio has to satisfy the following first-order conditions:
∂Lk
∂xkI







Note that for the first order conditions of the foreign investor, we set
θ=0 in Eqs. (C.3) and (C.4).





where Σixk is the covariance between the return on asset i, Ri and the
return on the investor's portfolio of risky assets R Eq. (C.5) has to be
satisfied for all Ri≥0, for all risky foreign assets in the portfolio of thedomestic investor, k. For θ=0, Eq. (C.5) must be satisfied for all domestic





Eq. (C.6) shows that the excess return on domestic assets which are
not subject to the tax θ on foreign risky assets is proportional to the
covariance of the return on asset i with respect to the portfolio of risky
assets. Eqs. (C.5) and (C.6) also represent the intuition that the share
of wealth invested in asset i is proportional to its Sharpe ratio. Note
that in Eq. (C.5) the excess return on foreign assets is subject to the
capital controls tax θ.
Eq. (C.5) completely characterizes asset demands in the model.
Further, from Eq. (C.5) we can show that domestic investors hold
risky assets in identical proportions and this implies that a foreign
asset that is not held (non-traded) by one domestic investor is
non-traded for all domestic investors. The theoretical result that if the
tax rate θ is positive, non-traded assets can exist implies that the
world market portfolio is not an efficient portfolio for all investors. In
other words, in the presence of capital controls taxes, the world market
portfolio does not belong in the set of linear combinations of portfolios
that yields an efficient portfolio for domestic investors.
We can now present a version of the Sharpe-Litner pricing relation-
ship modified to account for the capital controls tax θ.21 Since domestic
stocks can be held by both domestic and foreign investors and θ=0 for
domestic stocks, for domestic risky assets we can write:
βmi Rm−Rf−θm þ qm
  ¼ Ri−Rf for i ∈ D ðC:7Þ
where βim is the covariance of the a stock i with the world market
portfolio. Note that the world market portfolio includes all risky assets
traded in the two countries irrespective of whether domestic investors
hold all or a subset of them in their individual portfolios. Rm is the return
on the world market portfolio. Rf is the rate on the risk-free asset. θm is
the weighted average of the value of taxes that domestic investors
would have to pay on one dollar invested in theworldmarket portfolio.
qm is a constant chosen to ensure that Eq. (C.5) holds with equality
(i.e. the constraint is binding)22 multiplied by the world market portfo-
lio weights, xm.23 Note that foreign investors do not face the capital
controls tax on their investments in domestic or foreign assets.
The asset pricing relationship for foreign risky assets can be written
as:
βmi Rm−Rf−θm þ qm
 
−γdθþ γdqdi ¼ Ri−Rf for i ∈ Fð Þ ðC:8Þ
For risky foreign assets held by domestic investors, i.e. they are not in
the subset of non-traded foreign stocks, qid=0. Eq. (C.8) shows that the
expected returns on two foreign stocks held in domestic investor
portfolios will differ in the cross-section to the extent that they have
different betas with the world market portfolio. γdθ is the weighted
average of taxes paid by investors on their portfolio of risky assets.
Since some risky assets are non-traded, the individual portfolios can
differ from the world market portfolio. When there are no capital con-
trols taxes Eqs. (C.7) and (C.8) reduce to the usual Sharpe-Litner pricing
relationship.
Comparing Eqs. (C.7) and (C.8) also shows that all risky foreign
assets held in domestic investor portfolios will plot on a securitymarket
line which lies above the security market line for domestic investors
shifted up by γdθ since qid = 0 for all foreign stocks actually held. Also,
note from Eqs. (C.7) and (C.8) that a foreign stock with the same world
market beta as a domestic stock will have a higher expected return. Al-
ternatively, if a country switches regimes from having no capital con-Fig. C
Appendix Table 1
Robustness: CARs using MSCI world index.
Notes: The sample includes all events and the firms on the Bovespa exchange. Cumulative abno
MSCI world index. Log total assets, debt to assets, and short term debt to total debt all correspon
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Cum













Export b $1 mil
Export $1 mil–$100 mil
Export N $100 mil
Observations 1078 1016 100
R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.01
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡ p b 0.15.trols taxes to one where capital controls taxes are imposed, expected
returns on foreign risky assets subject to the tax will go up (e.g. a
move from 1 to 2 in Fig. C.1)..1
rmal returns are measured over a two-day window using Scholes-Williams betas and the
d to one year lagged values and are fromWorldscope. Export data arematched from Secex.
(4) (5) (6)
ulative abnormal returns (Scholes-Williams)
All events
.0759⁎⁎⁎ −0.0779⁎⁎⁎ −0.0918⁎⁎⁎ −0.0935⁎⁎⁎
216) (0.0239) (0.0221) (0.0239)
343⁎⁎⁎ 0.00332⁎⁎ 0.00317⁎⁎ 0.00328⁎⁎

















Notes: The sample includes all events and the firms on the Bovespa exchange. Cumulative abnormal returns are measured over a two-day window using Scholes-Williams betas and the
estimationwindowof event 10/19/2009. Log total assets, debt to assets, and short termdebt to total debt all correspond to one year lagged values and are fromWorldscope. Export data are
matched from Secex. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns (Scholes-Williams)
All events
Constant −0.00322⁎⁎⁎ −0.0325⁎⁎⁎ −0.0319⁎⁎⁎ −0.0257⁎⁎ −0.0334⁎⁎⁎ −0.0373⁎⁎⁎
(0.0012) (0.0099) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0091) (0.0101)
Log total assets
(lag 1y)
0.00175⁎⁎⁎ 0.00164⁎⁎⁎ 0.00141⁎⁎ 0.00170⁎⁎⁎ 0.00194⁎⁎⁎











Export b $1 mil −0.00085‡9
(0.0055)
Export $1 mil–$100 mil 0.00771⁎
(0.0047)
Export N $100 mil 0.00277
(0.0023)
Observations 1037 980 972 896 980 980
R-squared 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.014
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
‡
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